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Abstract
We construct the first tightly secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme based
on standard assumptions, which solves an open problem from Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan (CRYPTO 2014).
At the core of our constructions is a novel randomization technique that enables us to randomize
user secret keys for identities with flexible length.
The security reductions of previous HIBEs lose at least a factor of Q, which is the number of
user secret key queries. Different to that, the security loss of our schemes is only dependent on
the security parameter. Our schemes are adaptively secure based on the Matrix Diffie-Hellman
assumption, which is a generalization of standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions such as k-Linear. We
have two tightly secure constructions, one with constant ciphertext size, and the other with tighter
security at the cost of linear ciphertext size. Among other things, our schemes imply the first tightly
secure identity-based signature scheme by a variant of the Naor transformation.




Tight security. Reductions are useful tools for proving the security of public-key cryptographic
schemes. Asymptotically, a reduction shows that if there is an efficient adversary A that breaks the
security of a scheme, then we can have another adversary R that solves the underlying computationally
hard problem. Concretely, a reduction provides a security bound for the scheme, εA ≤ � · εR,1 where εA
is the success probability of A and εR is that of R. Ideally, it is more desirable to have � as small as a
constant. We say a reduction is tight if � is a small constant and the running time of A is approximately
the same as that ofR. Most of the current works have considered the tightness notion called “almost tight
security”, where � may linearly (or, even better, logarithmically) depend on the security parameter, but
not on the size of A.2 Recently, tightly secure cryptographic schemes drew a large amount of attention
(e.g. [HJ12, CW13, BKP14, GHKW16, GDCC16, AHN+17, GHKP18, HHK18]), since tightly secure
schemes do not need to compensate for any security loss.
∗Most of this work were done when both authors were at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany. In
particular, J. Pan was employed at the group of Dennis Hofheinz and supported by DFG grant HO 4534/4-1.
1Here we ignore the additive negligible terms for simplicity.
2In this paper, we do not distinguish almost tight security from tight security, but we will detail the security loss in the
security proof and comparison of our schemes.
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Table 1: Comparison of L-level HIBEs with identity-space ID = ({0, 1}α)≤L in prime-order pairing
groups. Schemes in gray are new ones from this paper. In particular, HIBKEMH1 is an improvement
of HIBKEM1 with collision-resistant hash functions, namely, implementing the generic construction (cf.
Figure 12) with the MAC scheme from Figure 7. Similarly, HIBKEMH2 is an improvement of HIBKEM2
with the MAC scheme from Figure 11. ‘|mpk|’, ‘|usk|’ and ‘|C|’ stand for the size of master public key,
user secret key and ciphertext. We count the number of group elements in G1,G2, and GT . For a scheme
that works in symmetric pairing groups, we write G := G1 = G2. The schemes that work in asymmetric
pairing groups can be instantiated with SXDH=1-LIN. Q is the number of user secret key queries by the
adversary. γ is the bit length of the range of a collision-resistant hash functions. In the ‘|usk|’ and ‘|C|’
columns p stands for the hierarchy depth of the identity vector
an (L+1)-level HIBE tightly implies an L-level CCA-secure HIBE via the CHK transformation [CHK04]
in the single-challenge setting.
Core idea. In a nutshell, the technical novelty of our constructions is a new randomization technique
that enables us to randomize user secret keys with flexible identity length. This technique is motivated
by the recent tightly CCA-secure public-key encryption of Gay et al. [GHKW16].
At the core of our constructions lie two new pseudorandom message authentication code (MAC)
schemes for messages with flexible length. Their pseudorandomness can be proven with tight reductions
to the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption [EHK+13]. The MDDH assumption is a
generalization of the known standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions, such as the k-linear (k-LIN) assump-
tion. Our MAC schemes have algebraic structures compatible with the BKP transformation. In the end,
together with a variant of the BKP framework [BKP14], we can tightly randomize user secret keys with
hierarchical identities, and we have tightly secure HIBEs.
A closer look at the BKP framework. The BKP framework proposes the notion of affine MACs
and transforms it to an (H)IBE scheme with pairings. Their transformation is tightness-preserving.
Under the MDDH assumption, if the affine MAC is tightly secure, then the (H)IBE is also tightly
secure. It is worth mentioning that the BKP transformation and its variants are widely used in con-
structing identity-based encryption [HJP18] with multi-challenge CCA security, predicate encryption
[Wee14, CGW15], quasi-adaptive NIZK [KW15], and structure-preserving signature [KPW15, GHKP18]
based on standard, static assumptions.
We recall their tightly secure MAC, MACNR, based on the Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function
[NR97], which is implicitly in the Chen-Wee (CW) IBE [CW13] as well. We observe in this paper that
MACNR is tightly secure in the semi-adaptive sense, which implies a tightly semi-adaptively secure HIBE.
For completeness, we provide a detailed proof for that in Appendix A. However, until now, we do not
know any tight security proof for the adaptive security of MACNR. In the following, we give a more
detailed analysis of that.
MACNR is defined over an additive prime-order group G2 := �P2� and its message space is correspond-
ing to the identity space of the resulting IBE. We use the implicit notation [x]2 := xP2 from [EHK+13].
MACNR chooses B ∈ Z(k+1)×kq according to the underlying assumption. For message space M := {0, 1}α,









and its MAC tag contains a message-independent vector [t]2 and a message-dependent value [u]2 in the
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(Hierarchical) identity-based encryption. The concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) was
proposed by Shamir [Sha84] to simplify the management of public keys and certificates. With an IBE
scheme, one can encrypt a message under a recipient’s identity id (for instance, email address or ID card
number), and this encrypted message can be decrypted with user id’s secret key from a trusted authority.
The first constructions of IBE were given in 2001 [BF01, Coc01, SOK00] in the random oracle model.
A hierarchical IBE (HIBE) scheme [HL02, GS02] generalizes the concept of IBE and provides more
functionality by forming levels of a hierarchy. In an L-level HIBE, a hierarchical identity is a vector of
maximal L identities, and a user at level i can delegate a secret key for its descendants at level i� (where
i < i� ≤ L). Moreover, a user at level i is not supposed to decrypt any encryption from a recipient who is
not among its descendants. HIBE schemes not only are more general than IBE schemes (for instance, an
IBE is simply a 1-level HIBE), but also provide numerous applications. Most famous ones are CCA-secure
IBEs [CHK04] and identity-based signatures [KN09] from HIBE. Both implications are tight.
Adaptive security is a widely accepted security notion for (H)IBEs, where an adversary is allowed to
adaptively choose a challenge identity id∗ after it sees the (master) public key and Q-many user secret
keys for adversarially chosen identities. To achieve adaptive security in the standard model, the early IBE
constructions require either non-tight reductions to the hardness of the underlying assumptions [Wat05,
CLL+13, Lew12, JR13], or Q-type, non-static assumptions [Gen06].
In 2013, Chen and Wee constructed the first tightly secure IBE based on static assumptions in the
standard model [CW13]. After that, several works have been done to improve its efficiency and achieve
stronger security [BKP14, HKS15, GDCC16, HJP18]. However, constructing an L-level HIBE for L > 1
with a tight (i.e., independent of Q) security reduction to a standard assumption remains open.
HIBEs meet tightness: difficulties and the hope. Before analyzing the difficulties of achieving
tightly secure HIBE, we consider the security loss of the current state-of-the-art HIBEs. The L-level
HIBE from [Wat05] has a relatively large security loss, QL, which depends on both Q and L. Although
the security loss of more recent HIBEs [Wat09, Lew12, CW13, BKP14, GCTC16] does not depend on
the number of maximal levels L, they are still not tight and lose a factor of Q.
In general, it is harder to construct HIBEs than IBEs, since HIBEs allow public delegation of user
secret keys, given the corresponding ancestor’s secret key. Hence, given a tightly secure IBE, there is no
(tight) black-box transformation to HIBE. The work of Lewko and Waters [LW14] shows the potential
difficulty of constructing HIBE with tight reductions. More precisely, [LW14] proves that it is hard to
have an HIBE scheme with security loss less than exponential in L if the HIBE has rerandomizable user
secret keys (over all “functional” user secret keys).
The first attempt of constructing tightly secure HIBEs is due to Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan (cf. the
proceeding version and the first full version of [BKP14]), where they tightly transform algebraic message
authentication code (MAC) schemes with affine structures to (H)IBE schemes. As long as the algebraic
MAC has tight security, the resulting (H)IBE is tightly secure. The first version of their paper contains
a tightly secure delegatable MAC, which results in a tightly secure HIBE. The resulting HIBE has
bypassed the impossibility result of [LW14] and their user secret keys are only rerandomizable over all
keys generated by the user secret key generation algorithm, which is only a subspace of all “functional”
keys. However, shortly after its publication, a flaw was found in a proof step of the delegatable MAC,
and they remove this tightly secure delegatable MAC from their paper. The flaw is basically due to the
fact that the BKP randomization technique failed to randomize MAC tags (which is an important part
of user secret keys) for hierarchical identities.
The hope of achieving tight security for HIBEs lies in developing a novel method that enables ran-
domization of user secret keys for identities with flexible level.
1.2 Our contributions
We answer the aforementioned open question affirmatively with two tightly secure hierarchical identity-
based encryption schemes with identity space ID := ({0, 1}α)≤L: One with constant ciphertext size (in
terms of the number of group elements) and O(αL2) security loss, and the other with ciphertext size
linear in L but O(αL) security loss. Both schemes are the first tightly secure HIBEs. We compare our
schemes with the existing HIBE schemes in prime-order pairing groups in Table 1.
Furthermore, via the known tight transformations from [KN09] and [CHK04], our HIBEs imply the
first tightly secure identity-based signature and tightly CCA-secure HIBEs almost for free. We note that
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Table 1: Comparison of L-level HIBEs with identity-space ID = ({0, 1}α)≤L in prime-order pairing
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of HIBKEM1 with collision-resistant hash functions, namely, implementing the generic construction (cf.
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user secret key and ciphertext. We count the number of group elements in G1,G2, and GT . For a scheme
that works in symmetric pairing groups, we write G := G1 = G2. The schemes that work in asymmetric
pairing groups can be instantiated with SXDH=1-LIN. Q is the number of user secret key queries by the
adversary. γ is the bit length of the range of a collision-resistant hash functions. In the ‘|usk|’ and ‘|C|’
columns p stands for the hierarchy depth of the identity vector
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tion. Our MAC schemes have algebraic structures compatible with the BKP transformation. In the end,
together with a variant of the BKP framework [BKP14], we can tightly randomize user secret keys with
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A closer look at the BKP framework. The BKP framework proposes the notion of affine MACs
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secure. It is worth mentioning that the BKP transformation and its variants are widely used in con-
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[Wee14, CGW15], quasi-adaptive NIZK [KW15], and structure-preserving signature [KPW15, GHKP18]
based on standard, static assumptions.
We recall their tightly secure MAC, MACNR, based on the Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function
[NR97], which is implicitly in the Chen-Wee (CW) IBE [CW13] as well. We observe in this paper that
MACNR is tightly secure in the semi-adaptive sense, which implies a tightly semi-adaptively secure HIBE.
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proposed by Shamir [Sha84] to simplify the management of public keys and certificates. With an IBE
scheme, one can encrypt a message under a recipient’s identity id (for instance, email address or ID card
number), and this encrypted message can be decrypted with user id’s secret key from a trusted authority.
The first constructions of IBE were given in 2001 [BF01, Coc01, SOK00] in the random oracle model.
A hierarchical IBE (HIBE) scheme [HL02, GS02] generalizes the concept of IBE and provides more
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IBE is simply a 1-level HIBE), but also provide numerous applications. Most famous ones are CCA-secure
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HIBE from [Wat05] has a relatively large security loss, QL, which depends on both Q and L. Although
the security loss of more recent HIBEs [Wat09, Lew12, CW13, BKP14, GCTC16] does not depend on
the number of maximal levels L, they are still not tight and lose a factor of Q.
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(tight) black-box transformation to HIBE. The work of Lewko and Waters [LW14] shows the potential
difficulty of constructing HIBE with tight reductions. More precisely, [LW14] proves that it is hard to
have an HIBE scheme with security loss less than exponential in L if the HIBE has rerandomizable user
secret keys (over all “functional” user secret keys).
The first attempt of constructing tightly secure HIBEs is due to Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan (cf. the
proceeding version and the first full version of [BKP14]), where they tightly transform algebraic message
authentication code (MAC) schemes with affine structures to (H)IBE schemes. As long as the algebraic
MAC has tight security, the resulting (H)IBE is tightly secure. The first version of their paper contains
a tightly secure delegatable MAC, which results in a tightly secure HIBE. The resulting HIBE has
bypassed the impossibility result of [LW14] and their user secret keys are only rerandomizable over all
keys generated by the user secret key generation algorithm, which is only a subspace of all “functional”
keys. However, shortly after its publication, a flaw was found in a proof step of the delegatable MAC,
and they remove this tightly secure delegatable MAC from their paper. The flaw is basically due to the
fact that the BKP randomization technique failed to randomize MAC tags (which is an important part
of user secret keys) for hierarchical identities.
The hope of achieving tight security for HIBEs lies in developing a novel method that enables ran-
domization of user secret keys for identities with flexible level.
1.2 Our contributions
We answer the aforementioned open question affirmatively with two tightly secure hierarchical identity-
based encryption schemes with identity space ID := ({0, 1}α)≤L: One with constant ciphertext size (in
terms of the number of group elements) and O(αL2) security loss, and the other with ciphertext size
linear in L but O(αL) security loss. Both schemes are the first tightly secure HIBEs. We compare our
schemes with the existing HIBE schemes in prime-order pairing groups in Table 1.
Furthermore, via the known tight transformations from [KN09] and [CHK04], our HIBEs imply the
first tightly secure identity-based signature and tightly CCA-secure HIBEs almost for free. We note that
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Essentially, our MAC first encodes m� as (m�1, . . . ,m�α) and (m�1, . . . ,m�2·α) and then uses (xi,b)1≤i≤α,b for
(m�1, . . . ,m�α) and (x̂j,b)1≤j≤2α,b for (m�1, . . . ,m�2·α), while the BKP MAC, MACNR, encodes m� as (m�1, . . . ,
m�α) and (m�α+1, . . . ,m�2·α). However, combining this new encoding method and the BKP randomization
strategy is not enough to achieve our goal.
By a similar argument as in BKP, we can randomize all the um for 1-level messages m and, after the





namely, we replace x�0 with RFα(m), but this affects the um′ for 2-level messages m� as well. More















If we continue to randomize um′ , we will run into the exact same problem as in the CW or BKP
randomization, namely, the output of both RFα and RFα+1 will be leaked in Hybrid α+ 1.
Motivated by [GHKW16], we hide RFα in some orthogonal space to solve the above problem. By
switching t into the “right” span, RFα appears in um, but gets canceled in um′ . Concretely, we choose
B $← Z3k×kq and B⊥ ∈ Z3k×2kq is a kernel matrix of B such that (B⊥)�B = 0. We replace t $← Zkq with
larger t $← Z3kq . Accordingly, we choose xi,b and x̂j,b from Z3kq . We embed the random function RFα into
the kernel of B and uy (y ∈ {m,m�}) has the form
uy :=
� ∼ + RFα(y|α)(B⊥)�
�
t+ x�0 ,
where “∼” denotes corresponding summation terms. During the randomization for 1-level messages, if
we choose t ∈ Span(B) := �v | ∃s ∈ Zkq : v = Bs
�
for 2-level messages m�, then RFα will get canceled
out; and if we choose t /∈ Span(B) for 1-level messages m, then RFα will appear and um gets randomized.
After the randomization for 1-level messages, um′ for 2-level messages m� is distributed the same as
in Equation (3) so that we can start 2-level randomization from a constant random function RF�0(ε)
multiplying with (B⊥)�, where ε denotes the empty string.
The way of developing RFα (or RF�2·α, respectively) from RF0 (or RF�0, respectively) is similar to
[GHKW16]. Roughly, we choose two random matrices B0,B1 $← Z3k×kq and decompose Z3kq into the span
of B,B0,B1. The span of B⊥ is decomposed into that of B∗0 ∈ Z3k×kq and B∗1 ∈ Z3k×kq . An overview of
the orthogonal relations between all these matrices is given in Figure 1. After the decomposition of linear
Figure 1: Solid lines mean orthogonal: B�B∗0 = B�1 B∗0 = 0 = B�B∗1 = B�0 B∗1 ∈ Zk×kq




i (m|i)(B∗1)�. By using the MDDH assumption, we can
switch [t]2 to the right span and develop RFi+1(m|i+1)(B⊥)� from RFi(m|i)(B⊥)� in a tight fashion.
In order to have public delegation, the user secret keys at level 1 contain delegation terms [x̂�j,bt]2.
Since our randomization at different levels is isolated, the published terms will not affect our random-
ization strategy. Details are given in Section 3.1. In the end, our security reduction loses a factor of
O(αL2) due to L-many randomization loops and the fact that in each loop an additional factor of O(αL)
is required. Applying a variant of the BKP transformation (cf. Section 4), we obtain the first HIBE
scheme with tight security.
Achieving tighter security. Our second MAC construction (MAC2 in Section 3.2) parallelizes the
above randomization strategy and it has a scheme with security loss O(αL). The cost of doing this is to
have different ti at different levels for a message with L levels, which results in an HIBE with O(L)-size
ciphertext via the BKP transformation.
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0 ∈ Zq , (1)
where B denotes the first k rows of B. The BKP transformation requires the MAC scheme has pseu-
dorandomness against chosen-message attacks (PR-CMA security), which is a decisional variant of the
standard existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA security). In order to pro-
vide a simpler and more intuitive discussion, we consider the standard EUF-CMA security of MACNR,
where an adversary A is allowed to see many MAC tags τm := ([tm]2, [um]2) on messages m of its choice
and tries to forge a fresh and valid forgery (m∗, τ∗) which satisfies Equation (1).
Following the CW argument [CW13], by a hybrid argument on the bit length of m, one can show
that the value [u]2 is pseudorandom such that it is hard for an adversary to forge. By embedding the
problem challenge in t and xi+1,1−b, the CW argument can manage to develop the following random
function RFi+1 for (i+ 1)-bit messages from a random function RFi for i-bit messages on-the-fly:
RFi+1(m|i+1) =
{
RFi(m|i) (if mi+1 = b)
RFi(m|i) + RF�i(m|i) (if mi+1 = 1− b)
, (2)
where b is the guess for the (i+ 1)-th bit of m∗ and m|i is the first i bits of m. Such an argument works
well if messages have fixed length. For messages m with fixed length, an adversary can see the output
of either RFi (in Hybrid i) or RFi+1 (in Hybrid i + 1), but not both. However, that is not the case for
messages m� with flexible length.
Concretely, identities for HIBEs are messages with flexible level. If we follow the CW and BKP
arguments, we first need to develop a random function at the 2-level based on that at the 1-level. The
critical case happens when we switch from Hybrid α (namely, the end of randomization at the 1-level) to
Hybrid α+1 (namely, the beginning of randomization at the 2-level). If we define RFα+1 (with message
space {0, 1}α ∪ {0, 1}α+1) via Equation (2) based on random functions RFα,RF�α (with message space
{0, 1}α), then we have RFα+1(m) = RFα+1(m||b) for a m ∈ {0, 1}α and that means the resulting RFα+1
is not a random function for messages with flexible levels.
1.3 Our approach: independent randomization
To circumvent the problem mentioned above, we propose a suitable pseudorandom MAC, which isolates
the tag randomization for messages with different levels. Our strategy is to randomize tags for messages
with only one level first, and then for those with two levels, and so on. By a novel use of the recent
subspace randomization refined from [GHKW16], tags for messages with different levels are randomized
independently.
Affine MACs with levels. We consider a new notion of affine MACs, called affine MACs with levels,
and we give two constructions of it. This new notion considers messages with flexible levels and enables
us to develop independent random functions RFα for messages with only one level (i.e., in {0, 1}α), and
RF�2·α for messages with only two levels (i.e., in {0, 1}2α), and so on. For simplicity, we present an
overview of our technique in terms of 2-level HIBEs (namely, the maximum level of the HIBE, L = 2),
namely, the hierarchical identity space ID := ({0, 1}α)≤2. We denote 1-level messages as m ∈ {0, 1}α
and 2-level messages as m� ∈ {0, 1}α·2.
Our first MAC construction MAC1’s secret keys have the form of
skMAC1 :=
(






)α·2 × Zq .

















t + x�0 ∈ Zq .
(3)
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Figure 1: Solid lines mean orthogonal: B�B∗0 = B�1 B∗0 = 0 = B�B∗1 = B�0 B∗1 ∈ Zk×kq




i (m|i)(B∗1)�. By using the MDDH assumption, we can
switch [t]2 to the right span and develop RFi+1(m|i+1)(B⊥)� from RFi(m|i)(B⊥)� in a tight fashion.
In order to have public delegation, the user secret keys at level 1 contain delegation terms [x̂�j,bt]2.
Since our randomization at different levels is isolated, the published terms will not affect our random-
ization strategy. Details are given in Section 3.1. In the end, our security reduction loses a factor of
O(αL2) due to L-many randomization loops and the fact that in each loop an additional factor of O(αL)
is required. Applying a variant of the BKP transformation (cf. Section 4), we obtain the first HIBE
scheme with tight security.
Achieving tighter security. Our second MAC construction (MAC2 in Section 3.2) parallelizes the
above randomization strategy and it has a scheme with security loss O(αL). The cost of doing this is to
have different ti at different levels for a message with L levels, which results in an HIBE with O(L)-size
ciphertext via the BKP transformation.
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0 ∈ Zq , (1)
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Concretely, identities for HIBEs are messages with flexible level. If we follow the CW and BKP
arguments, we first need to develop a random function at the 2-level based on that at the 1-level. The
critical case happens when we switch from Hybrid α (namely, the end of randomization at the 1-level) to
Hybrid α+1 (namely, the beginning of randomization at the 2-level). If we define RFα+1 (with message
space {0, 1}α ∪ {0, 1}α+1) via Equation (2) based on random functions RFα,RF�α (with message space
{0, 1}α), then we have RFα+1(m) = RFα+1(m||b) for a m ∈ {0, 1}α and that means the resulting RFα+1
is not a random function for messages with flexible levels.
1.3 Our approach: independent randomization
To circumvent the problem mentioned above, we propose a suitable pseudorandom MAC, which isolates
the tag randomization for messages with different levels. Our strategy is to randomize tags for messages
with only one level first, and then for those with two levels, and so on. By a novel use of the recent
subspace randomization refined from [GHKW16], tags for messages with different levels are randomized
independently.
Affine MACs with levels. We consider a new notion of affine MACs, called affine MACs with levels,
and we give two constructions of it. This new notion considers messages with flexible levels and enables
us to develop independent random functions RFα for messages with only one level (i.e., in {0, 1}α), and
RF�2·α for messages with only two levels (i.e., in {0, 1}2α), and so on. For simplicity, we present an
overview of our technique in terms of 2-level HIBEs (namely, the maximum level of the HIBE, L = 2),
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t + x�0 ∈ Zq .
(3)
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2.1 Pairing groups and matrix Diffie-Hellman assumptions
Let GGen be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that on input 1λ returns a description
G := (G1,G2,GT , q, P1, P2, e) of asymmetric pairing groups where G1, G2, GT are cyclic groups of order
q for a λ-bit prime q, P1 and P2 are generators of G1 and G2, respectively, and e : G1×G2 is an efficient
computable (non-degenerated) bilinear map. Define PT := e(P1, P2), which is a generator in GT . In
this paper, we only consider Type III pairings, where G1 �= G2 and there is no efficient homomorphism
between them. All constructions in this paper can be easily instantiated with Type I pairings by setting
G1 = G2 and defining the dimension k to be greater than 1.
We use the implicit representation of group elements as in [EHK+13]. For s ∈ {1, 2, T} and a ∈ Zq
define [a]s = aPs ∈ Gs as the implicit representation of a in Gs. Similarly, for a matrixA = (aij) ∈ Zn×mq
we define [A]s as the implicit representation of A in Gs. Span(A) := {Ar|r ∈ Zmq } ⊂ Znq denotes the
linear span of A, and similarly Span([A]s) := {[Ar]s|r ∈ Zmq } ⊂ Gns . Note that it is efficient to
compute [AB]s given ([A]s,B) or (A, [B]s) with matching dimensions. We define [A]1 ◦ [B]2 := e([A]1,
[B]2) = [AB]T , which can be efficiently computed given [A]1 and [B]2.
Next we recall the definition of the matrix Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) and related assumptions [EHK+13].
Definition 2.1 (Matrix distribution). Let k, � ∈ N with � > k. We call D�,k a matrix distribution if it
outputs matrices in Z�×kq of full rank k in polynomial time.
Without loss of generality, we assume the first k rows of A $← D�,k form an invertible matrix. The
D�,k-matrix Diffie-Hellman problem is to distinguish the two distributions ([A], [Aw]) and ([A], [u]) where
A $← D�,k, w $← Zkq and u $← Z�q.
Definition 2.2 (D�,k-matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption). Let D�,k be a matrix distribution and s ∈ {1,
2, T}. We say that the D�,k-matrix Diffie-Hellman (D�,k-MDDH) assumption holds relative to GGen in
group Gs if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvmddhD�,k,PGGen,s(A) := |Pr[A(G, [A]s, [Aw]s) = 1]− Pr[A(G, [A]s, [u]s) = 1]|
is negligible where the probability is taken over G $← GGen(1λ), A $← D�,k,w $← Zkq and u $← Z�q.
The uniform distribution is a particular matrix distribution that deserves special attention, as an
adversary breaking the U�,k assumption can also distinguish between real MDDH tuples and random
tuples for all other possible matrix distributions. For uniform distributions, they stated in [GHKW16]
that Uk-MDDH and U�,k-MDDH assumptions are equivalent.
Definition 2.3 (Uniform distribution). Let k, � ∈ N+ with � > k. We call U�,k a uniform distribution if
it outputs uniformly random matrices in Z�×kq of rank k in polynomial time. Let Uk := Uk+1,k.
Lemma 2.4 (U�,k-MDDH ⇔ Uk-MDDH [GHKW16]). Let �, k ∈ N+ with � > k. An U�,k-MDDH instance
is as hard as an Uk-MDDH instance. More precisely, for each adversary A there exists an adversary B
and vice versa with
AdvmddhU�,k,PGGen,s(A) = AdvmddhUk,PGGen,s(B)
and T (A) ≈ T (B).
Lemma 2.5 (D�,k-MDDH ⇒ Uk-MDDH [EHK+13]). Let �, k ∈ N+ with � > k and let D�,k be a matrix
distribution. A Uk-MDDH instance is at least as hard as an D�,k instance. More precisely, for each
adversary A there exists an adversary B with
AdvmddhUk,PGGen,s(A) ≤ AdvmddhD�,k,PGGen,s(B)
and T (A) ≈ T (B).
For Q ∈ N, W $← Zk×Qq ,U $← Z�×Qq , consider the Q-fold D�,k-MDDH problem which is distinguishing
the distributions ([A], [AW]) and ([A], [U]). That is, the Q-fold D�,k-MDDH problem contains Q inde-
pendent instances of the D�,k-MDDH problem (with the same A but different wi). By a hybrid argument,
one can show that the two problems are equivalent, where the reduction loses a factor Q. The following
lemma gives a tight reduction.
7
R. Langrehr J. Pan
1.4 More related work and open problems
Bader et al. [BHJ+15] use some idea from the BKP HIBE to construct digital signature schemes with
corruptions, but it does not involve any randomization for messages with flexible length, and thus it does
not have the same issue as the BKP.
Very recently, Hofheinz, Jia, and Pan [HJP18] extend the BKP construction with the information-
theoretical Cramer-Shoup-like argument of [GHKW16] to answer multiple challenge ciphertext queries
for IBE. However, we do not think that their technique and the one from [GDCC16] can work in a
straightforward way here to construct tightly multi-challenge secure HIBE. To give more details, the
main idea in [GHKW16, HJP18] is to have the secret keys as matrices instead of vectors in the BKP
construction such that they can create subspaces to answer multiple challenge queries. Since our ran-
domization technique is quite different from BKP, these subspace creating technique does not work here.
Essentially, the information-theoretic arguments in Lemmata 3.10, 3.11 and 3.14 (for our first MAC) and
Lemmata 3.25 and 3.26 (for our second MAC) will fail in the multi-challenge setting even with larger
secret keys as matrices. Thus, we leave achieving tight multi-challenge security for HIBE as an open
problem.
1.5 Publication Information and Acknowledgments
An extended abstract of this work appeared in the proceedings of PKC 2019 [LP19]. Shortly after the
publication, we got invited to submit our full version to the Journal of Cryptology (JoC) based on
the recommendation of the program chairs. We thank all our anonymous reviewers for their valuable
comments.
This paper is the JoC version of [LP19]. It contains a security proof of our second MAC scheme
with hash functions (cf. Theorem 3.19) and our generic HIBKEM construction (cf. Theorem 4.1), and
a concrete instantiation of our generic construction based on the SXDH assumption.
In [LP19] the constant factor of the security loss has been understated. In this work this has been
corrected. For details see end of Section 2.1.
2 Preliminaries
Notations. We use x $← S to denote the process of sampling an element x from S uniformly at random
if S is a set. For positive integers k, η ∈ N+ and a matrix A ∈ Z(k+η)×kq , we denote the upper square
matrix of A by A ∈ Zk×kq and the lower η rows of A by A ∈ Zη×kq . Similarly, for a column vector
v ∈ Zk+ηq , we denote the upper k elements by v ∈ Zkq and the lower η elements of v by v ∈ Zηq . We use
A−� as shorthand for
(
A−1
)�. For a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , we use Span(A) :=
{
Av | v ∈ Zmq
}
to denote






v | A�v = 0}.
For a set S and n ∈ N+, Sn denotes the set of all n-tuples with components in S. For a string
m ∈ Σn, mi denotes the i-th component of m (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and m|i denotes the prefix of length i of m.
Furthermore for a p-tuple of bit strings m ∈ ({0, 1}n)p, we use m to denote the string m1|| . . . ||mp.
Thus for 1 ≤ i ≤ np, mi denotes the i-th bit of m1|| . . . ||mp and m|i denotes the i-bit-long prefix of
m1|| . . . ||mp.
All algorithms in this paper are probabilistic polynomial-time unless we state otherwise. If A is an
algorithm, then we write a $← A(b) to denote the random variable outputted by A on input b.
Games. Following [BKP14], we use code-based games to define and prove security. A game G contains
procedures Init and Finalize, and some additional procedures P1, . . . ,Pn, which are defined in pseudo-
code. Initially all variables in a game are undefined (denoted by ⊥), all sets are empty (denote by ∅),
and all partial maps (denoted by f : A  B) are totally undefined. An adversary A is executed in
game G (denote by GA) if it first calls Init, obtaining its output. Next, it may make arbitrary queries
to Pi (according to their specification), again obtaining their output. Finally, it makes one single call to
Finalize(·) and stops. We use GA ⇒ d to denote that G outputs d after interacting with A, and d is
the output of Finalize. T (A) denotes the running time of A.
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We focus in this paper only on HIBKEM schemes with delegation invariance. The following definitions
of correctness and security are only suitable for delegation invariant schemes. For general HIBKEMs, a
more involved definition that takes the Del algorithm into account is necessary (see [SW08]).
Definition 2.9 (Correctness). A delegation invariant HIBKEM HIBKEM := (Gen,Del,Ext,Enc,Dec) is
correct, if for all λ ∈ N+, all pairs (pk, sk) generated by Gen(λ), all id ∈ ID, all usk[id] generated by
Ext(sk, id) and all (K, c) generated by Enc(pk, id):
Pr[Dec(usk[id], id,C) = K] = 1.
We define indistinguishability (IND-HID-CPA) against adaptively chosen identity and plaintext attacks
for a HIBKEM via games IND-HID-CPAreal and IND-HID-CPArand from Figure 2.
Figure 2: Games IND-HID-CPAreal and IND-HID-CPArand for defining IND-HID-CPA security. For any
identity id ∈ Sp, Prefix(id) denotes the set of all prefixes of id
Definition 2.10 (IND-HID-CPA security). A hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation scheme
HIBKEM is IND-HID-CPA-secure if for all PPT A,
Advind-hid-cpaHIBKEM (A) := |Pr[IND-HID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1]− Pr[IND-HID-CPAArand]|
is negligible.
2.3 Collision resistant hash functions
Some constructions in this paper make use of collision resistant hash functions.
Definition 2.11 (Hash function). A family of hash functions is a tupleH := (HGen,HEval) of polynomial
time algorithms with:
• HGen is a probabilistic algorithm that gets the security parameter 1λ and returns a (public) hash
key K.
• HEval is a deterministic algorithm that gets a hash key K and an input X ∈ DK and outputs a
hash HEvalK(X) ∈ RK , where DK is the domain set and RK is the finite range set.
The security notion we require for the hash functions is collision resistance.
Definition 2.12 (Collision resistance). A family of hash functions H := (HGen,HEval) is collision-
resistant if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvcrH(A) := Pr
[





is negligible in λ.
3 Affine MAC with levels
The core of our HIBE constructions is a Message Authentication Code with suitable algebraic structures,
and we call it affine MAC with levels. This is a generalization of the delegatable, affine MAC used in
[BKP14], namely, a delegatable, affine MAC is affine MAC with levels with �(p) = 1 for all p ∈ {1, . . . L}.
Definition 3.1 (Affine MAC with levels). An affine MAC with levels MAC consists of three PPT algo-
rithms (GenMAC,Tag,VerMAC) with the following properties:
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Lemma 2.6 (Random self-reducibility [EHK+13]). For � > k and any matrix distribution D�,k, the
D�,k-MDDH assumption is random self-reducible. In particular, for any Q ≥ 1 and any adversary A
there exists an adversary B with
(�− k)AdvmddhD�,k,PGGen,s(A) +
1
q − 1 ≥ Adv
Q-mddh
D�,k,PGGen,s(B) := |Pr[B(G, [A], [AW] ⇒ 1)]
− Pr[B(G, [A], [U] ⇒ 1)]| ,
where G $← GGen(1λ), A $← D�,k, W $← Zk×Qq , U $← Z(k+1)×Qq , and T (B) ≈ T (A) + Q · poly(λ) for a
polynomial poly independent of A.
In [LP19] we mistakenly assumed that the Q-fold U�,k-MDDH assumption is tightly equivalent to the
Q-fold Uk-MDDH assumption. However, Lemma 2.4 is only applicable for standard MDDH, not for Q-
fold MDDH. So when reducing Q-fold U�,k-MDDH to Uk-MDDH we have to apply Lemma 2.6 to get from
Q-fold U�,k-MDDH to standard U�,k-MDDH and then Lemma 2.4 to get from U�,k-MDDH to Uk-MDDH.
Thus for every adversary A there exists an adversary B with
AdvQ-mddhU�,k,PGGen,s(A) ≤ (�− k)AdvmddhUk,PGGen,s(B) +
1
q − 1 .
In our previous publication [LP19] (and various other publications, e.g. [GHKW16]) the factor � − k is
missing, because we mistakenly applied Lemma 2.4 to Q-fold MDDH instances. However, the proof of
Lemma 2.4 given in [GHKW16] fails here: Suppose (PG, [A], [U]) is a uniform Q-fold Uk-MDDH instance,
then (PG, [T�A], [T�U]) (for uniformly random full-rank T� ∈ Z�×(k+1)q ) is not a uniform Q-fold U�,k-
MDDH instance. The Uk-MDDH instance contains (Q+ k)(k + 1) random elements (from Zq), so the
transformed instance contains at most (Q+ �+ k)(k + 1) random elements. However, a uniform Q-fold
U�,k-MDDH instance requires (Q+ k)� random elements.
2.2 Hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation
We recall syntax and security of a hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (HIBKEM).
We only consider HIBKEM in this paper. By adapting the transformation for public-key encryption in
[HK07] to the HIBE setting, one can easily prove that every HIBKEM can be transformed (tightly) into
an HIBE scheme with a (one-time secure) symmetric cipher.
Definition 2.7 (Hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation mechanism). A hierarchical identity-
based key encapsulation mechanism (HIBKEM) HIBKEM consists of five polynomial time algorithms
HIBKEM := (Gen,Del,Ext,Enc,Dec) with the following properties.
• The probabilistic key generation algorithm Gen(1λ) returns the (master) public/delegation/secret
key (pk, dk, sk). Note that for some constructions dk is empty. We assume that pk implicitly
defines a hierarchical identity space ID = S≤L, for some base identity set S, a key space K and a
ciphertext space C.
• The probabilistic user secret key generation algorithm Ext(sk, id) returns a secret key usk[id] and a
delegation key udk[id] for a hierarchical identity id ∈ ID. Note that for some constructions udk[id]
is empty.
• The probabilistic key delegation algorithm Del(dk, usk[id], udk[id], id ∈ Sp, idp+1 ∈ S) returns a user
secret key usk[id|idp+1] for the hierarchical identity id� = id | idp+1 ∈ Sp+1 and the user delegation
key udk[id�]. We require 1 ≤ |id| ≤ L− 1.
• The probabilistic encapsulation algorithm Enc(pk, id) returns a symmetric key K ∈ K together with
a ciphertext C with respect to the hierarchical identity id ∈ ID.
• The deterministic decapsulation algorithm Dec(usk[id], id,C) returns a decapsulated key K ∈ K or
the reject symbol ⊥.
In the HIBKEM definition we make the delegation key dk explicit to make our constructions more
readable.
Definition 2.8 (Delegation Invariance). An HIBKEM HIBKEM := (Gen,Del,Ext,Enc,Dec) is delegation
invariant, if the distribution of usk[id|idp+1] generated by Del(usk[id], udk[id], id, idp+1) for any valid user
secret key usk[id], udk[id] for id is independent of usk[id], udk[id] and identical to the distribution of keys
generated by Ext(sk, id|idp+1).
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We focus in this paper only on HIBKEM schemes with delegation invariance. The following definitions
of correctness and security are only suitable for delegation invariant schemes. For general HIBKEMs, a
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Ext(sk, id) and all (K, c) generated by Enc(pk, id):
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We define indistinguishability (IND-HID-CPA) against adaptively chosen identity and plaintext attacks
for a HIBKEM via games IND-HID-CPAreal and IND-HID-CPArand from Figure 2.
Figure 2: Games IND-HID-CPAreal and IND-HID-CPArand for defining IND-HID-CPA security. For any
identity id ∈ Sp, Prefix(id) denotes the set of all prefixes of id
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HIBKEM is IND-HID-CPA-secure if for all PPT A,
Advind-hid-cpaHIBKEM (A) := |Pr[IND-HID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1]− Pr[IND-HID-CPAArand]|
is negligible.
2.3 Collision resistant hash functions
Some constructions in this paper make use of collision resistant hash functions.
Definition 2.11 (Hash function). A family of hash functions is a tupleH := (HGen,HEval) of polynomial
time algorithms with:
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is negligible in λ.
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Lemma 2.6 (Random self-reducibility [EHK+13]). For � > k and any matrix distribution D�,k, the
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Figure 4: The first affine MAC
Theorem 3.3 (Security of MAC1[U3k,k]). MAC1[U3k,k] is tightly HPR0-CMA secure in G2 under the







q − 1 +
2Q
q2k
and T (B) ≈ T (A)+Q·poly(λ), where Q denotes the number of Eval queries of A and poly is a polynomial
independent of A.
Proof. The proof uses a hybrid argument with the hybrids G0 (the HPR0-CMAreal game), G1, for ı̂ ∈ {1, . . .
. . . , L} G2,̂ı,0, G2,̂ı,1, G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α}, G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1–G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α− 1}, G2,̂ı,3, G2,̂ı,4,
G2,̂ı,5 and finally G3. The hybrids are given in Figure 5 and 6. A summary can be found in Table 2. They
make use of random functions RFı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×2kq , RF(0)ı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq , and RF(1)ı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq ,
defined on-the-fly.









Proof. In game G1 each time the adversary queries a tag for a message m where he queried a tag for
m before, the adversary will get a rerandomized version of the first tag he queried. The rerandomized
tag is identically distributed to a fresh tag: t� := t + Bs� is uniformly random in Span(B), when s� is







we get a valid message tag for
m, when ([t]2, [u]2) is a valid tag for m.
Note that the rerandomization uses only the “public key” returned by the Init oracle, so it could
actually be carried out by the adversary herself. To put it in a nutshell, repeated Eval queries for a
message m will leak no information, that is not already leaked by the first Eval query for m or by the
“public key”.4









Proof. These two games are equivalent.
4The same technique can be used to prove the IBE of [BKP14] secure with duplicated Eval-queries. Thus they work
without a pseudorandom function.
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Figure 3: Games HPR0-CMAreal, and HPR0-CMArand for defining HPR0-CMA security for affine MACs
with levels







where B ∈ Zn×n′q , xl,i,j ∈ Znq for l∈{1, . . . , �(L)},
i∈{1, . . . , L}, and j∈{0, . . . , ��(l, i)} and x�0 ∈ Zq.
• Tag�skMAC,m ∈ Sp≤L
�





















⎠tl + x�0 . (4)
• VerMAC(skMAC,m, τ = ([t]2, [u]2)) checks, whether Equation (4) holds.
The messages ofMAC have the form m = (m1, . . . ,mp) where p ≤ L and mi ∈ S. After the transformation
to an HIBE, S will be the base set of the identity space and L will be the maximum number of levels.
The functions fl,i,j : Si → Zq must be public, efficiently computable functions. The parameters � :
{1, . . . , p} → N+, n, n� ∈ N+ and �� : {1, . . . , p} × {1, . . . , L} → N+ (1 ≤ i ≤ L) are arbitrary, scheme-
depending parameters. The function � must be monotonous increasing.
Security. We require hierarchical pseudorandomness against chosen-message attacks (HPR0-CMA-
security) for affine MACs with levels. This is a generalization of the HPR0-CMA-security for delegatable
affine MACs defined in [BKP14].The security is defined by games in Figure 3.
Definition 3.2 (HPR0-CMA security). An affine MAC with levels is HPR0-CMA-secure in G2 if for all











3.1 The first construction
Let (G2, q, P2) be a group of prime order q. The first affine MAC with levels MAC1[U3k,k] := (GenMAC,
Tag,VerMAC) with message space ID := S≤L := ({0, 1}α)≤L is defined in Figure 4. The identity vectors
bit-length α and the maximum length L of the identity vectors can be chosen freely.3 The resulting
HIBE from this MAC has constant ciphertext length.
MAC1[U3k,k] has n := 3k and n� := k where k ∈ N+ can be chosen arbitrary. To match the formal







. Then we get �(p) = 1
and ��(1, i) = 2iα.
3A different bit-length on each level is possible as well, but we assume it is α on each level to ease notation.
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Figure 4: The first affine MAC
Theorem 3.3 (Security of MAC1[U3k,k]). MAC1[U3k,k] is tightly HPR0-CMA secure in G2 under the







q − 1 +
2Q
q2k
and T (B) ≈ T (A)+Q·poly(λ), where Q denotes the number of Eval queries of A and poly is a polynomial
independent of A.
Proof. The proof uses a hybrid argument with the hybrids G0 (the HPR0-CMAreal game), G1, for ı̂ ∈ {1, . . .
. . . , L} G2,̂ı,0, G2,̂ı,1, G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α}, G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1–G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α− 1}, G2,̂ı,3, G2,̂ı,4,
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to an HIBE, S will be the base set of the identity space and L will be the maximum number of levels.
The functions fl,i,j : Si → Zq must be public, efficiently computable functions. The parameters � :
{1, . . . , p} → N+, n, n� ∈ N+ and �� : {1, . . . , p} × {1, . . . , L} → N+ (1 ≤ i ≤ L) are arbitrary, scheme-
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affine MACs defined in [BKP14].The security is defined by games in Figure 3.
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Let (G2, q, P2) be a group of prime order q. The first affine MAC with levels MAC1[U3k,k] := (GenMAC,
Tag,VerMAC) with message space ID := S≤L := ({0, 1}α)≤L is defined in Figure 4. The identity vectors
bit-length α and the maximum length L of the identity vectors can be chosen freely.3 The resulting
HIBE from this MAC has constant ciphertext length.
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Table 2: Summary of the hybrids in Figure 5 and 6. Non-duplicated Eval queries with p = ı̂ draw t
from the set described by the second column and add the randomness ru(m)t to u or choose u uniform
random. The Chal query adds the term rh0(m�)
�
h to h0 if m� has length ≥ ı̂. The column “Transition”
displays how we can switch to this hybrid from the previous one. The background colors indicate repeated
transitions









Proof. These two games are equivalent. When changing in G2,̂ı,1 the secret values xı̂,1,b to xı̂,1,b +
B⊥(RFı̂,0(ε))� (for b ∈ {0, 1}), we get game G2,̂ı,2,0,0. The distribution of xı̂,1,b and xı̂,1,b+B⊥(RFı̂,0(ε))�
is identical. Note that the term B⊥(RFı̂,0(ε))� cancels out in the master public key and in the user
delegation keys of Eval-queries with p < ı̂.
Lemma 3.9 (G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,0  G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1). For all ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α} and all adversaries A there exists an adver-
sary B with ∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı,2,ĵ,0 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 4kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
2
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. These two games are equivalent except that the value t is generated uniformly random from
Z3kq in game G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,0 and from either Span(B|B0) or Span(B|B1) depending on the bit mĵ+1 in game
G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1. We can switch from G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,0 to G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1 with two Q-fold U3k,k-MDDH challenges. Remember
that the U3k,k-MDDH assumption is equivalent to the Uk-MDDH assumption by Lemma 2.4.
To achieve that, we first switch t for mĵ+1 = 0 from a random vector in Z3kq to t := Bs1 + s2
where s1 $← Zkq and s2 $← Z3kq . This change is only conceptual. Then we change s2 from a random
vector in Z3kq to a random vector in the span of B0 via the MDDH assumption. More precisely, let
([B0]2, [Z]2) ∈ G3k×(k+Q)2 be a Q-fold U3k,k-MDDH challenge. For the i-th Eval query with mĵ+1 = 0,
the reduction B computes [t]2 := [Bs1 + Z[i]]2, where s1 $← Zkq and Z[i] is the i-th column vector of Z.
To ensure that the column vectors of (B|B0|B1) form a basis of Z3kq , the reduction chooses B,
B1 $← U3k,k such that (B|B1) has rank 2k and checks whether the kernels of B�0 and (B|B1)� are disjoint.
This is equivalent to (B|B0|B1) forming a basis of Z3kq and can be done over the group by testing for all
column vectors b of (B|B1)⊥ whether B�0 b �= 0. By generating new matrices B,B1 $← U3k,k until this
is satisfied, we can ensure that B,B0,B1 is a basis of Z3kq .
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Figure 5: Hybrids for the security proof of MAC1[U3k,k]. The algorithm RerandTag is only helper function
and not an oracle for the adversary. The partial map K is initially totally undefined
Lemma 3.6 (G2,̂ı,0  G2,̂ı,1). For all ı̂ ∈ {1, . . . , L} and all adversaries A there exists an adversary B
with ∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı,0 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı,1 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 2kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
1
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. These two games are equivalent except that in Eval-queries with p = ı̂ the value t is chosen
uniformly random from Span(B) in G2,̂ı,0 and uniformly random from Z3kq in game G2,̂ı,1. Since for all
computed values it is enough to have [B]2 instead of B, this leads to a straightforward reduction to
the Q-fold U3k,k-MDDH assumption. Remember that by Lemma 2.4, the U3k,k-MDDH assumption is
equivalent to the Uk-MDDH assumption.
The running time of B is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.
Lemma 3.7 (G2,̂ı,1  G2,̂ı,3). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı,1 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı,3 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 8kı̂αAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
4ı̂α




where Qı̂ denotes the number of Eval queries with p = ı̂ and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. To prove this transition, we introduce new hybrids G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,0 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α} and G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1–
G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α− 1}. The hybrids are given in Figure 6.
Lemma 3.7 follows directly from Lemma 3.8–3.13.
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Table 2: Summary of the hybrids in Figure 5 and 6. Non-duplicated Eval queries with p = ı̂ draw t
from the set described by the second column and add the randomness ru(m)t to u or choose u uniform
random. The Chal query adds the term rh0(m�)
�
h to h0 if m� has length ≥ ı̂. The column “Transition”
displays how we can switch to this hybrid from the previous one. The background colors indicate repeated
transitions
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Figure 5: Hybrids for the security proof of MAC1[U3k,k]. The algorithm RerandTag is only helper function
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Lemma 3.6 (G2,̂ı,0  G2,̂ı,1). For all ı̂ ∈ {1, . . . , L} and all adversaries A there exists an adversary B
with ∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı,0 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı,1 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 2kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
1
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. These two games are equivalent except that in Eval-queries with p = ı̂ the value t is chosen
uniformly random from Span(B) in G2,̂ı,0 and uniformly random from Z3kq in game G2,̂ı,1. Since for all
computed values it is enough to have [B]2 instead of B, this leads to a straightforward reduction to
the Q-fold U3k,k-MDDH assumption. Remember that by Lemma 2.4, the U3k,k-MDDH assumption is
equivalent to the Uk-MDDH assumption.
The running time of B is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.
Lemma 3.7 (G2,̂ı,1  G2,̂ı,3). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı,1 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı,3 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 8kı̂αAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
4ı̂α




where Qı̂ denotes the number of Eval queries with p = ı̂ and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. To prove this transition, we introduce new hybrids G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,0 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α} and G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1–
G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , ı̂α− 1}. The hybrids are given in Figure 6.
Lemma 3.7 follows directly from Lemma 3.8–3.13.
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Figure 6: Hybrids for the transition from G2,̂ı,1 to G2,̂ı,3. The algorithm RerandTag is defined in Figure 5
If Z is uniform, B simulates the game G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,0. If Z is from Span(B0) then B simulates the game
G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1 for messages with mĵ+1 = 0.
By using the same argument, we can switch t for mĵ+1 = 1 from a random vector in Z3kq to a
random vector in Span(B|B1).
The running time of B is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.



















































if mĵ+1 = 1
,
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where RF�(0)ı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq is another independent random function. Since RF(0)ı̂,ĵ does not appear in
game G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,2 anymore, RF(0)ı̂,ĵ+1 is a random function.
Eval queries with p �= ı̂ use the same code in both games and Eval queries with p = ı̂ and mĵ+1 = 0
are distributed identically in both games, by definition of RF(0)ı̂,ĵ+1.
Eval queries with p = ı̂ and mĵ+1 = 1 are distributed identically in both games, since for those






The Chal query uses the same code if p < ı̂ and otherwise it is distributed identically if m�ĵ+1 = 0.
For the case m�ĵ+1 = 1 note that xı̂,ĵ+1,1 is identically distributed as xı̂,ĵ+1,1 +B∗0w for w $← Zkq and
w is hidden from the adversary except for the Chal query: In all Eval queries with p �= ı̂ only xı̂,ĵ+1,1B
is used and thus the B∗0-part cancels out. In the Eval queries with p = ı̂ there is either mĵ+1 = 0
which means that xı̂,ĵ+1,1 is not used to compute the tag or there is mĵ+1 = 1 which means that
t ∈ Span(B|B1) and thus the B∗0 -part of xı̂,ĵ+1,1 cancels out. All in all this means that the value h0
is the only one in the game that depends on w and thus the B∗0-part of h0 is uniformly random to the
adversary. Especially h0 is distributed identically in both games.






























if mĵ+1 = 1
,
where RF�(1)ı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq is another independent random function. Since RF(1)ı̂,ĵ in not used in game
G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3, RF(1)ı̂,ĵ+1 is a random function.
The argument, that the games G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,2 and G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 are identically distributed, is the same as in
Lemma 3.10, just with the roles of 0 and 1 swapped.
Lemma 3.12 (G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3  G2,̂ı,2,ĵ+1,0). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
��Pr�GA2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 ⇒ 1
�− Pr�GA2,̂ı,ĵ+1 ⇒ 1
��� ≤ 4kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
2
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
















�� to avoid computing B∗0 and B∗1. This does not change the distribution, since B∗0,B∗1




. The remaining transition is the reverse of Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 3.13 (G2,̂ı,2,̂ıα,0  G2,̂ı,3). Let Qı̂ denote the number of Eval queries with p = ı̂.
��Pr�GA2,̂ı,2,̂ıα,0 ⇒ 1
�− Pr�GA2,̂ı,3 ⇒ 1
��� ≤ Qı̂
q2k
Proof. In game G2,̂ı,2,̂ıα,0 the Chal-query evaluates RFı̂,̂ıα only for the input value m�1|| . . . ||m�ı̂ (if p ≥ ı̂,
otherwise it does not use RFı̂,̂ıα at all). Assume Prefix(m�) ∩ QM = ∅, otherwise the adversary has
lost the game anyway. In each Eval query with p = ı̂ the value RFı̂,̂ıα(m)
�
B⊥
��t is part of u. This is
the only place where RFı̂,̂ıα(m) is used, since only the first Eval query for each message evaluates the
random function. Thus each query outputs a uniformly random value for u when t /∈ Span(B), which
happens with probability ≥ 1− 1/�q2k�. In this case the games are distributed identically.
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G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,1 for messages with mĵ+1 = 0.
By using the same argument, we can switch t for mĵ+1 = 1 from a random vector in Z3kq to a
random vector in Span(B|B1).
The running time of B is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.
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where RF�(0)ı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq is another independent random function. Since RF(0)ı̂,ĵ does not appear in
game G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,2 anymore, RF(0)ı̂,ĵ+1 is a random function.
Eval queries with p �= ı̂ use the same code in both games and Eval queries with p = ı̂ and mĵ+1 = 0
are distributed identically in both games, by definition of RF(0)ı̂,ĵ+1.
Eval queries with p = ı̂ and mĵ+1 = 1 are distributed identically in both games, since for those






The Chal query uses the same code if p < ı̂ and otherwise it is distributed identically if m�ĵ+1 = 0.
For the case m�ĵ+1 = 1 note that xı̂,ĵ+1,1 is identically distributed as xı̂,ĵ+1,1 +B∗0w for w $← Zkq and
w is hidden from the adversary except for the Chal query: In all Eval queries with p �= ı̂ only xı̂,ĵ+1,1B
is used and thus the B∗0-part cancels out. In the Eval queries with p = ı̂ there is either mĵ+1 = 0
which means that xı̂,ĵ+1,1 is not used to compute the tag or there is mĵ+1 = 1 which means that
t ∈ Span(B|B1) and thus the B∗0 -part of xı̂,ĵ+1,1 cancels out. All in all this means that the value h0
is the only one in the game that depends on w and thus the B∗0-part of h0 is uniformly random to the
adversary. Especially h0 is distributed identically in both games.






























if mĵ+1 = 1
,
where RF�(1)ı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq is another independent random function. Since RF(1)ı̂,ĵ in not used in game
G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3, RF(1)ı̂,ĵ+1 is a random function.
The argument, that the games G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,2 and G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 are identically distributed, is the same as in
Lemma 3.10, just with the roles of 0 and 1 swapped.
Lemma 3.12 (G2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3  G2,̂ı,2,ĵ+1,0). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
��Pr�GA2,̂ı,2,ĵ,3 ⇒ 1
�− Pr�GA2,̂ı,ĵ+1 ⇒ 1
��� ≤ 4kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
2
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
















�� to avoid computing B∗0 and B∗1. This does not change the distribution, since B∗0,B∗1




. The remaining transition is the reverse of Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 3.13 (G2,̂ı,2,̂ıα,0  G2,̂ı,3). Let Qı̂ denote the number of Eval queries with p = ı̂.
��Pr�GA2,̂ı,2,̂ıα,0 ⇒ 1
�− Pr�GA2,̂ı,3 ⇒ 1
��� ≤ Qı̂
q2k
Proof. In game G2,̂ı,2,̂ıα,0 the Chal-query evaluates RFı̂,̂ıα only for the input value m�1|| . . . ||m�ı̂ (if p ≥ ı̂,
otherwise it does not use RFı̂,̂ıα at all). Assume Prefix(m�) ∩ QM = ∅, otherwise the adversary has
lost the game anyway. In each Eval query with p = ı̂ the value RFı̂,̂ıα(m)
�
B⊥
��t is part of u. This is
the only place where RFı̂,̂ıα(m) is used, since only the first Eval query for each message evaluates the
random function. Thus each query outputs a uniformly random value for u when t /∈ Span(B), which
happens with probability ≥ 1− 1/�q2k�. In this case the games are distributed identically.
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Figure 7: The first affine MAC improved with a hash function
Proof. The games execute the same code if p < ı̂ and otherwise we can argue that xı̂,1,m�1 and
xı̂,1,m�1 −B⊥(RFı̂,̂ıα(m�))
� are identical distributed. All Eval queries and the “public key” returned
by Init make only use of xı̂,1,m�1B, so the B
⊥(RFı̂,̂ıα(·))� part cancels out.
Lemma 3.15 (G2,̂ı,4  G2,̂ı,5). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı,4 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı,5 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 2kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
1
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. The transition is the reverse of Lemma 3.6.










Proof. These two games are equivalent.









Proof. In game G2,L,5 the value x�0 is only used to compute h1, thus h1 is a uniform random value to A
and the games are distributed identical.
Summary. To prove Theorem 3.3, we combine Lemmas 3.4–3.17 to change h1 from real to random and
then apply all Lemmas in reverse order to get to the HPR0-CMArand game.
Optimization. MAC1[U3k,k] can be improved with a collision-resistant hash function. In MAC1[U3k,k]













x�j for a collision resistant hash function H.
Formally, we need a family of hash functions H := (HGen,HEval) with domain S≤L and range {0, 1}γ
for all hash keys. The affine MAC MACH1 [U3k,k] is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 8: The second affine MAC with levels
Theorem 3.18 (Security of MACH1 [U3k,k]). MACH1 [U3k,k] is tightly HPR0-CMA secure in G2 when H
is collision resistant and the Uk-MDDH assumption holds for G2. More precisely, for all adversaries A
there exist adversaries B and C with









and T (B) ≈ T (A) + Q · poly(λ) and T (C) ≈ T (A) + Q · poly(λ), where Q denotes the number of Eval
queries of A and poly is a polynomial independent of A.
We omit the proof of this theorem, since it is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3. The main
idea is rather standard: We use the collision resistance of H to reject the collision and then we apply the
hybrid argument on the hash output.
3.2 The second construction
Let (G2, q, P2) be a group of prime order q. The second affine MAC with levels MAC1[U3k,k] :=
(GenMAC,Tag,VerMAC) with message space ID := S≤L := ({0, 1}α)≤L is defined in Figure 8. The iden-
tity vectors bit-length α and the maximum length L of the identity vectors can be chosen freely. The
difference to the first construction is that this MAC uses a different tl on each level (�(p) = p) and thus
needs no delegation keys. This leads to shorter user secret keys and allows a more efficient reduction.
However, this comes at the price of larger ciphertexts. Formally, this MAC uses ��(l, i) = 0 for i < p and
��(l, i) = 2iα for i = p.
Theorem 3.19 (Security of MAC2[U3k,k]). MAC2[U3k,k] is tightly HPR0-CMA secure in G2 under the
Uk-MDDH assumption for G2. More precisely, for all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with




q − 1 +
2Q
q2k
and T (B) ≈ T (A)+Q·poly(λ), where Q denotes the number of Eval queries of A and poly is a polynomial
independent of A.
Proof. The proof uses a hybrid argument with the hybrids G0 (the HPR0-CMAreal game), G1, G2, G3,ĵ for
ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , Lα}, G3,ĵ,1–G3,ĵ,3 for ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , Lα− 1} and finally G4. The hybrids are given in Figures 9
and 10. A summary can be found in Table 3. They make use of random functions RFi,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×2kq ,
RF(0)i,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq and RF(1)i,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq , defined on-the-fly.
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Figure 7: The first affine MAC improved with a hash function
Proof. The games execute the same code if p < ı̂ and otherwise we can argue that xı̂,1,m�1 and
xı̂,1,m�1 −B⊥(RFı̂,̂ıα(m�))
� are identical distributed. All Eval queries and the “public key” returned
by Init make only use of xı̂,1,m�1B, so the B
⊥(RFı̂,̂ıα(·))� part cancels out.
Lemma 3.15 (G2,̂ı,4  G2,̂ı,5). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı,4 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı,5 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 2kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
1
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. The transition is the reverse of Lemma 3.6.










Proof. These two games are equivalent.









Proof. In game G2,L,5 the value x�0 is only used to compute h1, thus h1 is a uniform random value to A
and the games are distributed identical.
Summary. To prove Theorem 3.3, we combine Lemmas 3.4–3.17 to change h1 from real to random and
then apply all Lemmas in reverse order to get to the HPR0-CMArand game.
Optimization. MAC1[U3k,k] can be improved with a collision-resistant hash function. In MAC1[U3k,k]













x�j for a collision resistant hash function H.
Formally, we need a family of hash functions H := (HGen,HEval) with domain S≤L and range {0, 1}γ
for all hash keys. The affine MAC MACH1 [U3k,k] is shown in Figure 7.
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Table 3: Summary of the hybrids in Figure 9 and 10. Non-duplicated Eval queries draw ti from the
set described by the second column and add the randomness
∑p
i=1 ru(m, i)ti to u or choose u uniform
random. The Chal query adds the term rh0(m�, i)h to each h0,i. The background color indicates
repeated transitions









Proof. In game G1 each time the adversary queries a tag for a message m and he queried a tag for m
before, the adversary will get a rerandomized version of the first tag he queried. The rerandomized tag is
identically distributed to a fresh tag: t�i := ti +Bs�i is uniformly random in Span(B), when s�i is uniform








we get a valid message tag for m, when(
([ti]2)1≤i≤p, [u]2
)
is a valid tag for m.
Note that the rerandomization can be carried out by just using the “public key” returned by the
Init oracle, so it could actually be carried out by the adversary herself. To put it in a nutshell, repeated
Eval queries for one message m leak no information, that is not already leaked by the first Eval query
for m or by the “public key”.
Lemma 3.21 (G1  G2). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
∣∣Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 2kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
1
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. These two games are equivalent except that the values ti are generated uniformly random from
Span(B) in G1 and uniformly random from Z3kq in game G2. Since for all computed values it is enough to
have [B]2 instead of B, this leads to a straightforward reduction to the QL-fold U3k,k-MDDH assumption.
Remember that by Lemma 2.4, the U3k,k-MDDH assumption is equivalent to the Uk assumption.
The running time of B is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.









Proof. The games are equivalent. When changing in G2 the secret values xi,1,b to xi,1,b +B⊥(RFi,0(ε))�
(for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and b ∈ {0, 1}), we get game G3,0. The distribution of xi,1,b and xi,1,b +
B⊥(RFi,0(ε))� is identical. Note that the term B⊥(RFi,0(ε))� cancels out in the public key.
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Figure 9: Hybrids for the security proof of MAC2[U3k,k]. The algorithm RerandTag is only helper function
and not an oracle for the adversary. The partial map K is initially totally undefined
Lemma 3.23 (G3,ĵ  G3,ĵ+1). For all ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , Lα− 1} and all adversaries A there exists an adver-
sary B with ∣∣Pr[GA3,ĵ ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA3,ĵ+1 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 8kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
4
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. To prove this transition, we introduce new hybrids G3,ĵ,1, G3,ĵ,2 and G3,ĵ,3. The hybrids are given
in Figure 10.
Lemma 3.23 follows directly from Lemma 3.24–3.27.
Lemma 3.24 (G3,ĵ  G3,ĵ,1). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
∣∣Pr[GA3,ĵ ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA3,ĵ,1 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ 4kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
2
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. These two games are equivalent except that the values ti are generated uniformly random from
Z3kq in game G3,ĵ and from Span(B|B0) respectively Span(B|B1) in game G3,ĵ,1 for i ∈ {ı̂, . . . , p}. We can
switch from G3,ĵ to G3,ĵ,1 with two QL-fold U3k,k-MDDH challenges. Remember that the U3k,k-MDDH
assumption is equivalent to the Uk assumption by Lemma 2.4.
The first challenge is used to change the distribution of ti from Z3kq to Span(B|B0) for the Eval-
queries with mĵ+1 = 0. Therefore, on input of a QL-fold U3k,k-MDDH challenge ([B0]2, [Z]2) where
B0 ∈ Z3k×kq and the column vectors of Z ∈ Z3k×QLq are either uniform random from Z3kq or uniform
random from Span(B0).
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Figure 10: Hybrids for the transition from G3,ĵ to G3,ĵ+1
We can now switch from G3,ĵ to an intermediate hybrid, where the Eval queries with mĵ+1 = 0
are distributed as in G3,ĵ,1 and everything else is distributed as in game G3,ĵ. Therefore, first change in
game G3,ĵ the generation of those ti with i ≥ ı̂ in Eval queries with mĵ+1 = 0 to s1 $← Zkq ; s2 $← Z3kq ;
t := Bs1 + s2. Adversary B now derives B0 from the Uk-MDDH challenge and draws B,B1 $← U3k,k
until (B|B1) has rank 2k and the kernels of B�0 and (B|B1)� are disjoint, i.e., all column vectors b of
(B|B1)⊥ satisfy B�0 b �= 0. The last check can be done with [B0]2 over G2. Like this, the column vectors
of B, B0 and B1 form a random basis of Z3kq .
Now set in the ι-th Eval query ti := Bs1+Z[ιL+ i] where s1 $← Zkq and Z[i] is the i-th column vector
of Z. If the column vectors of Z are uniform random from Z3kq , B is simulating game G3,ĵ. Otherwise,
if the column vectors of Z are uniform random from Span(B0), t is uniformly random from Span(B|B0)
and B is simulating the intermediate hybrid.
We proceed analogously to switch from the intermediate hybrid to game G3,ĵ,1.
The running time of B is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.
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if mĵ+1 = 1
,
where RF�(0)i,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq is another independent random function. Since RF(0)i,ĵ in not used in game
G3,ĵ,2, RF(0)i,ĵ+1 is a random function.
Eval queries with mĵ+1 = 0 are distributed identically in both games, by definition of RF(0)i,ĵ+1.
Eval queries with mĵ+1 = 1 are distributed identically in both games, since for those queries (for







The Chal query is distributed identically if p < ı̂ or m�ĵ+1 = 0. For the case p ≥ ı̂ and m�ĵ+1 = 1
note that for all i ∈ {ı̂, . . . , p}, xi,ĵ+1,1 is identically distributed as xi,ĵ+1,1 +B∗0wi for wi $← Zkq and wi
is hidden to the adversary since in all Eval queries (with p ≥ ı̂) there is either mĵ+1 = 0 which means
that xi,ĵ+1,1 (for all i ∈ {ı̂, . . . , p}) is not used to compute the tag or there is mĵ+1 = 1 which means
that ti ∈ Span(B|B1) and thus the B∗0 -part of xi,ĵ+1,1 cancels out. All in all this means that the value
h0,i is the only one in the game that depends on wi and thus the B∗0-part of h0,i is uniformly random to
the adversary. Especially it is distributed identically in both games.






























if mĵ+1 = 1
,
where RF�(1)ı̂,ĵ : {0, 1}ĵ → Z1×kq is another independent random function. Since RF(1)i,ĵ in not used in game
G3,ĵ,3, RF(1)i,ĵ+1 is a random function.
The argument, that the games G3,ĵ,2 and G3,ĵ,3 are identically distributed, is the same as in Lemma
3.25, just with the roles of 0 and 1 swapped.
Lemma 3.27 (G3,ĵ,3  G3,ĵ+1). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
��Pr�GA3,ĵ,3 ⇒ 1
�− Pr�GA3,ĵ+1 ⇒ 1
��� ≤ 4kAdvmddhUk,PGGen,2(B) +
2
q − 1
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
















�� to avoid computing B∗0 and B∗1. This does not change the distribution, since




. The remaining transition is the reverse of Lemma 3.24.
Lemma 3.28 (G3,Lα  G4).
��Pr�GA3,Lα ⇒ 1
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Figure 11: The second affine MAC improved with a hash function
Proof. The challenge query evaluates RFi,iα only for the input value m�|i. Assume Prefix(m�) ∩QM = ∅,




is part of u. This is the only place where RFp,pα(m) is used, since only the first Eval query for each
evaluates the random function. Each query outputs a uniformly random value for u when tp /∈ Span(B),
which happens with probability ≥ 1− 1/q2k. In this case h1 is the only value depending on x�0 and thus
uniform random as well.
Summary. To prove Theorem 3.19, we combine Lemmas 3.20–3.28 to change h1 from real to random
and then apply all Lemmas in reverse order to get to the HPR0-CMArand game.
Optimization. MAC2[U3k,k] can be improved, like MAC1[U3k,k], with a collision-resistant hash function.














x�j , where H is a
collision resistant hash function.
Formally, we need a family of hash functions H := (HGen,HEval) with domain S≤L and range {0, 1}γ
for all hash keys. The affine MAC MACH2 [U3k,k] is shown in Figure 11.
Theorem 3.29 (Security of MACH2 [U3k,k]). MACH2 [U3k,k] is tightly HPR0-CMA secure in G2 when H
is collision resistant and the Uk-MDDH assumption holds for G2. More precisely, for all adversaries A
there exist adversaries B and C with









and T (B) ≈ T (A) + Q · poly(λ) and T (C) ≈ T (A) + Q · poly(λ), where Q denotes the number of Eval
queries of A and poly is a polynomial independent of A.
We omit the proof of this theorem because it is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, just with
the changes we already mentioned for theorem Theorem 3.18.
4 Transformation to HIBE
Any affine MAC with levels can be transformed tightly to a hierarchical identity-based key encapsula-
tion mechanism (HIBKEM) under the Dk-MDDH assumption in G1. The transformation is shown in
Figure 12. It is a generalization of the transformation from delegatable, affine MACs to HIBKEMs in
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Figure 12: The Transformation HIBKEM of an affine MAC with levels to an HIBKEM
[BKP14]. We only consider HIBKEM here, and one can easily prove that every HIBKEM can be trans-
formed (tightly) into an HIBE scheme with a (one-time secure) symmetric cipher by adapting a similar
transformation for public-key encryption in [HK07].
Theorem 4.1 (Security of the HIBKEM transformation). The HIBKEM HIBKEM[MAC,Dk] is
IND-HID-CPA secure in G under the Dk-MDDH assumption for G1 if MAC is HPR0-CMA secure in G2.
More precisely, for all adversaries A there exist adversaries B1 and B2 with
Advind-hid-cpaHIBKEM[MAC,Dk],G(A) ≤ Adv
hpr0-cma
MAC,G2 (B1) + 2AdvmddhDk,PGGen,1(B2)
and T (B1) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ) and T (B2) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ), where Q denotes the number of Ext
queries of A and poly is a polynomial independent of A.
The detailed proof of Theorem 4.1 can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 13: The resulting scheme HIBKEM1 := HIBKEM[MAC1[U3k,k],Dk]
4.1 Instantiations
4.1.1 MDDH.







+ 3k2 + 2k group elements in the public key and 4k + 1 group elements in
the ciphertext. The user secret keys have at most α
(
L2/2 + L/2− 1)(k + 1) + 4k + 1 group elements.
Identities that are deeper in the hierarchy have smaller secret keys since the user secret key size is
dominated by the size of the delegation keys. On the last level, the user secret keys consist of only 4k+1
group elements.







+3k2 +2k group elements in the public key and 3Lk+ k+1 group elements in
the ciphertext. The user secret keys have at most 3Lk+k+1 group elements. Identities that are deeper
in the hierarchy have larger secret keys.
The schemes have both the same public key. The first scheme has smaller ciphertexts, while the
second has a more efficient reduction and smaller user secret keys in the worst case.
4.1.2 SXDH.
With a type III pairing, both of our schemes can be instantiated with the SXDH assumption.
The result (HIBKEM1) of instantiating scheme HIBKEM[MAC1[U3k,k],Dk] with the SXDH assumption




+ 5 group elements in the public key and 5 group
elements in the ciphertext. The user secret keys have at most 2α
(
L2 + L− 2)+ 5 group elements.
The result (HIBKEM2) of instantiating scheme HIBKEM[MAC2[U3,1],U2,1] with the SXDH assumption




+ 5 group elements in the public key and 3L + 2
group elements in the ciphertext. The user secret keys have at most 3L+ 2 group elements.
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Figure 14: The resulting scheme HIBKEM2 := HIBKEM[MAC2[U3k,k],Dk]
Figure 15: The resulting scheme HIBKEM[MAC1[U3k,k],Dk]
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Figure 16: The resulting scheme HIBKEM[MAC2[U3,1],U2,1]
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A Semi-adaptive Security of the BKP MAC
Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan proposed in [BKP14] an affine MAC with a tight security reduction in the non-
hierarchical setting. This MAC can be generalized to the hierarchical setting in the semi-adaptive
security model, as shown in Figure 17. In the semi-adaptive security model, the adversary has to send
the challenge identity id� before asking for user secret keys and after seeing the public key, in contrast
to the adaptive security model described above. Formally, the semi-adaptive security model is defined
via the games in Figure 18.
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Figure 17: Description of MAChNR[Dk], a hierarchical version of MACNR[Dk] from [BKP14].
Figure 18: Games IND-saHID-CPAreal and IND-saHID-CPArand for defining IND-saHID-CPA-security. For
any identity id ∈ Sp, Prefix(id) denotes the set of all prefixes of id.
Definition A.1 (IND-saHID-CPA security). A hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation scheme
HIBKEM is IND-saHID-CPA-secure if for all PPT A,
Advind-sahid-cpaHIBKEM (A) := |Pr[IND-saHID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1]− Pr[IND-saHID-CPAArand]|
is negligible.
For MACs we define saHPR0-CMA security similar to HPR0-CMA security, just with the difference
that the adversary has to send the challenge message before any Tag queries. Such a MAC can be
transformed into an IND-saHID-CPA secure HIBE in the same way as in the full security setting.
The main difference to the original, non-hierarchical MAC is that the randomness in the Tag algorithm
s is random and not pseudo-random. Thus the tags are not deterministic, and we need to take care of
duplicated tag queries for a single message. We do this in our proof by storing for each message m the
first tag we computed and return a randomized version of this tag for each follow-up Tag query for m.
This randomization only requires knowledge of the public key.
We call messages (m1, . . . ,mp) critical, if (m1, . . . ,mp−1) is a prefix of the challenge message m�.
For each message m the critical prefix is the prefix of m, that is a critical message. The critical prefix
exists and is unique for all messages, that are not a prefix of the challenge message m�. Our overall
proof strategy is to randomize u in all Tag oracle queries for critical messages and for Tag oracle queries
of non-critical messages we simulate a Tag oracle query the critical prefix and use the key delegation
mechanism to obtain a tag for the actual message.
Theorem A.2 (Security of MAChNR[Dk]). MAChNR[Dk] is tightly saHPR0-CMA secure in G2 under the
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Figure 19: Hybrids for the security proof of MAChNR[Dk]. The algorithm Delegate is only helper function
and not an oracle for the adversary.
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. The proof uses a hybrid argument with hybrids G0, G1, G2,̂ı for ı̂ ∈ {0, . . . , αL} and G3. G0 is
the saPR-CMAreal game, the other games are defined in Figure 19. They make use of a random functions
RFı̂ : {0, 1}ı̂ → Z1×kq , for i ∈ {0, . . . , αL}, defined on-the-fly.









Proof. In game G1 the queried message tags are not computed directly; instead we compute a tag for the
prefix m� of m, that is one component longer than the longest common prefix of m and m�. This prefix
exists when m is not a prefix of m�. The tag for m� is then delegated to a tag for m and re-randomized.
This requires only the public key. The distribution of a delegated and re-randomized tag is the same as
the distribution of a fresh tag; thus, the games are identical.









Proof. In game G2,0 we replace x�0 with RF0(ε), which is equivalent.
Lemma A.5 (G2,̂ı  G2,̂ı+1). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B with
∣∣Pr[GA2,̂ı ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2,̂ı+1 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ AdvmddhDk,PGGen,2(B)
and T (B) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
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if mı̂+1 = 1− m�ı̂+1
,
where RF�ı̂ : {0, 1}ı̂ → Zq is another independent random function. Note that whenever RFı̂+1 is evaluated,
RFı̂ is not evaluated. This is because the adversary is not allowed to query the tags for any prefix of m�
since each such message would be a prefix of the challenge message m�.
The adversary B uses the random self reducibility to get a Q-fold Dk-MDDH challenge ([A]2, [H]2),
where Q denotes the number of tag queries. The reduction uses a function φ : {0, 1}ı̂ → {1, . . . , Q} that
has to be injective on all prefixes of queried messages. It can be computed on-the-fly. The reduction is
given in Figure 20.
The reduction computes the public key honestly except for xi�,j�,1−(m�i�)j�
. The public key is dis-
tributed correctly since r�A is a uniform random k dimensional row vector, just like x�
i�,j�,1−(m�i�)j�
B
would be for a uniform random x�
i�,j�,1−(m�i�)j�
.
Chal, Finalize and Eval queries with K(m�) �=⊥ are the same as in G2,̂ı and G2,̂ı+1. The Eval
queries with p� < i� ∨ m�ı̂ = m�ı̂ remain also unchanged. Note that for these queries, the tag






For the Eval queries with p� ≥ i� ∧ m�ı̂ �= m�ı̂ write Hc =: AWc + Rc for some Wc ∈ Zq and
























⎟⎟⎠t+ x�i�,j�,1−(m�i�)j�B(s+Wc)� �� �
t





















:= r�Rc and the
reduction is simulating G2,̂ı. Note that for these queries, the tag delegation keys [di,j,b]2 can be computed
from xi,j,b and [t]2 since xi,j,b is known to the adversary for all i > p� ≥ i�.









Proof. In game G2,Lα all the us in tags for a message prefix m� are masked by RFLα evaluated at the
unique value m�. So they are uniformly random as in G3.
Summary. To prove Theorem A.2, we combine Lemmas A.3–A.6 to change h1 from real to random and
then apply all Lemmas in reverse order to get to the saHPR0-CMArand game.
B Security of the HIBKEM transformation
Proof (of Theorem 4.1). The proof makes use of the hybrids G0–G4 defined in Figure 21. G0 is the
IND-HID-CPAreal game.
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Figure 20: Adversary B for the proof of Lemma A.5. The helper algorithm Delegate is given in Figure 19.









Proof. The only difference between these games is that c∗1,l and K∗ are computed with the public value
Zl,i,j in game G0 and with the secret key xl,i,j and Yl,i,j in G1.
Lemma B.2 (G1  G2). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B2 with
∣∣Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ AdvmddhU2,1,PGGen,1(B2)
and T (B2) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
Proof. The only difference between these is that c∗0 is chosen from Span(A) in G1 and from Z2q in G2.
The running time of B2 is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.









Proof. These two games are equivalent. First notice that the values Zl,i,j and z�0 are uniform random









) ·A ⇐⇒ y��0 = (z�0 − x�0A)A−1 .
Game G3 is obtained from G2 by choosing Zl,i,j and z�0 uniform random and replacing all occurrences of
the values Yl,i,j and y�0 with the above equation. Thus the games are equally distributed.
Lemma B.4 (G3  G4). For all adversaries A there exists an adversary B1 with
∣∣Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1
]− Pr[GA4 ⇒ 1
]∣∣ ≤ Advhpr0-cmaMAC,G2 (B1)
and T (B1) ≈ T (A) +Q · poly(λ).
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Figure 21: Hybrids for the security proof of the HIBKEM transformation.
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Figure 22: Adversary B for Lemma B.4.
Proof. The adversary B is given in Figure 22. When B plays the HPR0-CMAreal game with the affine
MAC with levels challenger, he simulates the game G3 for A. On the other hand, when B plays the
HPR-CMArand game with the MAC challenger, he simulates the game G4 for A.
The running time of B1 is dominated by the running time of A plus some (polynomial) overhead that
is independent of T (A) for the group operations in each oracle query.
Summary. To prove Theorem 4.1, we combine Lemmas B.1–B.4 to change the key K from real to
random and then apply all Lemmata (except Lemma B.4) in reverse order to get to the IND-HID-CPArand
game.
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